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In spite of or perhaps because of the recent international monetary crises, 
the European Community's goal of economic and monetary union by the end of 
the decade is running on course. At least, that's the conclusion of a recently 
released study by two European monetary experts. 
Herman Wortmann, head of the EC Commission's monetary affairs division, 
and his principal administrator Florent Bonn base their conclusion on the 
progressively collective action taken by the individual EC member countries 
during the recurrent world monetary crises. Although written before the most 
recent international monetary turmoil, their thesis seems reinforced by the 
EC decision in the face of the February/March crisis for a joint currency float. 
The Wortmann-Bonn study, entitled "The Theory and Practice of MOnetary 
Integration in Europe," was published in the spring issue of Banking in Greater 
Europe (Das Bankwesen im Grtlsseren Europa, published by Nomos, of Baden-Baden, 
Germany). 
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The study talks of a twofold objective for monetary union: Internally, 
it would enable goods, services, people, and capital to circulate freely without 
structural or regional imbalances and distortions. Externally, toward the United 
States for instance, the Community would form a single and therefore effective 
unit in the international monetary system. 
Without complete monetary union, the Community's internal common market 
will never function properly and fully, and the EC member countries individually 
lack the monetary weight to be more than pawns in the international money game 
with resultant undesired effects on their economies. 
Although academics and theorists disagree on the optimum definition of 
monetary union and the optimal means of achieving it, most agree that the 
primary prerequisite for monetary integration is political will. Such will is 
often born from purely practical considerations. 
High Employment Without Devaluation 
Unilateral currency exchange adjustments by the EC member governments n0w more 
often fail than succeed in bringing stable economic conditions. Increasing 
fluctuations in currency values play havoc with international trade, on which 
Europe is much more dependent than, say, the United States or the Soviet Union. 
Currency fluctuations also have undesired effects on balance of payments structures, 
lead to high inflation rates, and weaken the international role of national 
currencies. 
In addition, unilateral national action can have little effect on ever 
stronger multinational corporations, "hot money" flows, and Eurodollar operations. 
To achieve high employment levels without devaluation or price stability 
without revaluation, common action is increasingly seen by the EC countries 
as the only practical solution. Hand in hand with monetary integration goes 
regional policy. The two compliment each other and reinforce the EC member 
states' political will toward both. 
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With complete monetary union, individual EC countries' balance of 
payments difficulties would appear in the form of regional imbalances. These 
imbalances would be mitigated by diverting income from more developed regions. 
In other words, taxes in depressed regions would be less than public expenditure. 
A single European currency -- or, at least, the nine national currencies linked 
irrevocably at immovable exchange rates, and freely convertible -- would make 
such a regional development policy feasible. 
Monetary Integration To Date 
The political will for a regional policy was expressed at the Paris "Surrnnit" 
in October 1972 when the "Nine" set the end of 1973 as the deadline for the 
creation of a Regional Development Fund. 
Also at the Summit, the Nine reaffirmed their determination to achieve 
complete economic and monetary union by 1980. Such a display of political will 
was preceded by nearly 15 years of discussion, proposals, and action. 
Articles 104 and 109 of the Rome Treaty, which established the European 
Economic Community (EEC) in 1958, refer to the need for coordinating national 
monetary policies as required by economic circumstances. No concrete proposal 
was made, however, until 1962, when the Commission proposed that exchange rates 
be fixed to avoid disturbances in the common agricultural policy. The Council 
of Ministers failed to act on this program. 
On May 8, 1964, the Council did act. It created a Committee of Central 
Bank Governors and a Budgetary Policy Committee. These committees facilitated 
joint monetary consultation. Moreover, the governments of the then six EC 
member states agreed to consult before altering currency parities. The 
international monetary crises of 1968-69 brought unilateral devaluation of 
the French franc and revaluation of the German mark, but not without prior 
consultations among the "Six." 
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On December 1-2, 1969, at the Hague Summit, the Six agreed on economic 
and monetary union as a goal of the Community. It would be gradually established 
along the lines of a Commission proposal -- the so-called Barre Plan -- through 
increased monetary cooperation. 
Modeled on the Federal Reserve 
On October 8, 1970, a Community-level committee of financial experts, headed 
by Luxembourg Finance Minister Pierre Werner, noted the incompleteness of the 
common market until monetary union was achieved. The Werner Group thus proposed 
a Community system of central banks, modeled in part after the US Federal 
Reserve System, together with an economic decision-making center responsible 
to the European Parliament. A first stage of three years toward monetary union 
would be launched on an experimental and pragmatic basis. 
On March 22, 1971, the Council agreed to coordinate short-term and some 
long-term economic policies, to encourage more cooperation between EC central 
banks, and to create machinery for medium-term financial support. Most importantly, 
exchange rate margins between EC currencies would be progressively narrowed. 
This Council action made it possible for the member states to adopt a 
common position in the international monetary system, thus facilitating the 
Smithsonian Agreement of December 18, 1971. 
On October 20, 1972, at the conclusion of the Paris Summit, the Nine 
issued a communique which affirmed the "determination of the member states of 
the enlarged European Communities irreversibly to achieve economic and monetary 
union ... The necessary decisions should be taken in the course of 1973 so as 
to allow the transition to the second stage of the economic and monetary union 
on January 1, 1974, and with a view to its completion not later than December 
31, 1980." 
On April 6, 1973, the key move was taken when the European Monetary 
Cooperation Fund began operations in Luxembourg. 
